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Abstract 
 
  
This paper presents a simple general equilibrium model involving trips from 
residential areas to a central business district, along with modal choice between cars 
and public transit.  Using a calibrated numerical model, we investigate the relative 
merits of ownership and use taxes. The proposed model is used to evaluate traffic 
control policies in Singapore and can be used in other Asian countries. We compare 
full internalisation of congestion externalities to optimal tax outcomes for the 
different tax types.  In our framework, use taxes restore Pareto optimality since 
congestion damage rises with more trips.  Ownership taxes only partially internalise 
congestion externalities.  However, in terms of revenue-raising ability, the marginal 
excess burdens in the neighbourhood of optimal taxes are typically lower for 
ownership taxes than use taxes.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Concern about increasing traffic congestion and its environmental and health 
consequences has been an important research agenda in the past decade. There is a growing 
realisation that based on current policies, transport trends are unsustainable.  For the 
developed countries, many policy documents have advocated the need for pricing reforms – 
“prices have to be right in order to get transport right” (see EEC Green Paper 1995 and EU 
White paper 1999). In many Asian cities, traffic congestion has grown rapidly in recent years, 
threatening in some countries to become major impediment to development (Midgley 1994 
and Forbes 1996).  For example, Bangkok’s “traffic disaster” has been infamous, and 
increasingly Beijing, Taipei, Jakarta, Manila and Seoul are referred too with similar labels 
(Dolven et al. 1997).   
As traffic congestion worsens in major cities in Asia, one key element in the growing 
policy debate about how to respond is the choice of instrument to internalize the externalities 
associated with traffic.1  As discussed in Madhaven (2000), the policy issues relating to urban 
transport are multi-faceted, involving air quality, congestion, infrastructure and safety.  In this 
paper, we focus on congestion externality.  Many years ago, Vickery (1969) and Walters 
(1961), and more recently by Button and Verhoef (1998) argue that traffic related 
externalities arise from travellers responding to the average congestion inflicted on them by 
all other travellers rather than to the marginal damage their own travel inflicts on other 
travellers.  Typically, marginal damage exceeds average damage, and some form of transit 
related tax is therefore justified on externality correction grounds.  The issue is the form the 
tax intervention should take.   
No country has been more innovative in Asia in this field than Singapore which has 
long implemented vehicle congestion policies.  Policy makers in Singapore were the first to 
experiment with fiscal and regulatory traffic control measures to restrict both the ownership 
and use of cars (see Chia and Phang 2001 for details).  As these measures have grown in 
coverage over the years, they have come to account for a growing and ever larger share of 
                                                  
1 Others, for example, Bernick and Cervero (1996) suggest the development of efficient, environmentally 
friendly transit communities that hug metropolitan rail systems to reduce gridlock and spur growth in cities. 
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government revenue. Chia (1998) estimated that around 30% of tax and fee income of the 
government in Singapore comes from vehicle related sources. These begin mainly as 
ownership taxes with large tariffs on imported cars (in an otherwise free trade regime), 
continue with government issued certificates which must be bought when cars are acquired; 
annual registration taxes, gasoline taxes, transit taxes paid for entrance into the central 
business district, and other levies.  In recent years there has been a policy shift towards motor 
vehicle taxes based on car use. As part of a motor vehicle tax rationalisation programme in 
1998, ownership taxes have been lowered while use taxes in the form of new electronic road 
pricing have been increased.  Arising from these changes, a pertinent issue is whether use 
taxes are superior to ownership taxes to internalise congestion externality.  
 There is little prior literature on the relative merits of ownership and use taxes in 
Asian cities.2  At first sight, the choice between ownership and use taxes for internalizing 
congestion related externalities may seem straightforward.  Marginal decisions to travel are 
directly affected by gasoline taxes, road pricing, and other road usage related instruments.  
Hence, ownership taxes affect the decision to acquire vehicles, but not their use once 
acquired.  Hence, ownership taxes reduce the number of operating vehicles, use taxes their 
mileage driven.  But in reality, the differences involved are more subtle.  Use taxes can also 
be used to affect the composition of traffic through the day, while ownership taxes are more 
difficult (although not impossible) to use in this way.3  Also, ownership taxes affect the size 
of vehicle purchased, and other characteristics.    
 In this paper, we use a general equilibrium model to compare the welfare effects of 
ownership and use taxes.  Our model captures the transit between periphery areas and a city 
centre and also the modal choice between buses and cars.  Congestion (and hence transit time) 
                                                  
2 De Jong (1990) used micro-simulation techniques to determine the impacts of changing the costs of both car 
ownership and car usage in a model with a non-linear household budget set arising from fixed and variable 
costs.  His model, however, is a partial equilibrium model and does not capture congestion externalities.  The 
issue of appropriate tax design, the subject of this paper, is thus not addressed by De Jong.  
3Some large cities, such as Mexico City, have attempted to restrict traffic by allowing car use on specified 
days in accordance with the end number of licence plates.  Singapore also experimented with an "off-peak 
car" scheme which restricted car use to non-peak hours and weekends only, by lowering the fixed cost of 
owning such cars through various tax concessions (see Chia and Phang (2001) for details).  
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is an increasing function of car traffic density; and if more time is consumed in transit, less 
time is available for market production.  Costs of transit involve ownership costs (acquisition 
costs amortised over time) and use costs (gasoline and fees).  We assume a production 
function for city activity with labour as inputs  
While use taxes can be set in this model so as to fully internalise the congestion 
externality, since car trips are the source of additional congestion, the tax must be set as an 
explicit transit fee per trip. An ownership tax cannot achieve full internalisation since it does 
not change the price of additional trips, which are the source of damage.  Since, gasoline taxes 
apply only to the non-time variable inputs into trips; they also cannot achieve full 
internalization, if there is substitution between inputs (time and gasoline via speed driven). 
Our simulations, based on Singapore data, show that use taxes can better internalize 
congestion externalities than ownership taxes, but that ownership taxes are more revenue 
efficient than use taxes since the marginal excess burden of raising a dollar of revenue from 
an ownership tax is smaller than that from a use tax.  This is because ownership taxes tax 
away some of the surplus accruing to car users who do not switch to buses, since only a small 
percentage of people change from car to bus use under a tax.  Unlike use taxes, some of the 
revenue raised is non-distortionary and hence while ownership taxes may not achieve full 
internalisation, they are typically more revenue efficient.  Also, the optimum ownership tax 
rate is lower than the optimal use tax since the base is larger for the former than for the latter. 
 The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 describes the model used to compare 
ownership and use taxes.  The implementation and calibration of the model using Singaporean 
data is given in Section 3.  Section 4 reports and discusses the simulation results.  Concluding 
remarks are offered in Section 5. 
 
 
2. A TRAFFIC CONGESTION MODEL WITH OWNERSHIP AND USE TAX 
 
We use a simple equilibrium model that captures both the fixed and variable costs of 
car use as well as modal choice between buses (public transit) and cars.  In this model, taxes 
 4
on ownership and/or use of cars will induce bus/car substitution, affect traffic density, and 
hence congestion.   
On the demand side of the model, individuals have utility functions defined over trips 
and goods, and each individual faces a non-linear budget set, depending on whether he is a 
car owner or a public transit user.  Individuals in the economy differ in income (but have the 
same preferences), so that with fixed costs of car ownership, individuals with low incomes 
use buses, while high-income individuals use cars.  With this assumption, we are able to 
isolate the impacts of different tax types on the choice of mode.  It is common in some models 
to treat transit as reflecting a required daily trip to work and hence model the number of trips 
as exogenous.  We think of trips as referring to kilometres travelled, and so more demand for 
trips can reflect a larger distance travelled per trip. 
We consider utility maximisation subject to a non-linear budget set.  The non-linearity 
of the budget set comes about because of the fixed cost of car ownership and the difference in 
the relative price of trips by car and trips by bus.  Individual's utility U is defined over trips 
(T), which include both work and pleasure trips, and a composite good (G).  Trips may be 
taken on buses ( bT ) or cars ( cT ). 
Max  U = U (T , G)         (1) 
where T = max ( bT , cT  )     s.t. bT  = 0 if cT  > 0 and  cT  = 0 if bT  > 0    (2) 
subject to the budget constraints, 
 Y       = PgG + bTP  T
b         (3) 
 Y - F =  PgG + cTP  T
c         (4) 
where Y is the household income, F is the fixed cost of car ownership, Pg is the price of the 
composite good G and bTP  and 
c
TP  respectively represent the consumer price of trips by bus 
and car.  The latter can be thought of as both time and gasoline costs. 
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We assume an exogenous individual distribution of income.  Given prices of the two 
types of trips, we can derive the demand for goods using Roy's identity and taking derivatives 
of the indirect utility function.  The indirect utility function for the bus regime, for example, 
defined as ),,( bTgi
B PPYV  will yield a corresponding direct utility ),( bi
B
i TGU for which the 
indifference curve is tangent to the budget set for individual i.  Given the price of the two 
types of trips, a threshold income SY  exists such that an individual with income SY  will be 
indifferent between trips by car or bus; i.e., the indirect utilities under the two regimes are 
equalized. 
),,( bTgS
B PPYV  = ),,( cTgs
C PPFYV −       (5) 
 
Modal choice is affected by the relative prices of the two trip types and the size of the 
fixed cost of car ownership.  The population is thus divided into two segments -- bus users 
whose incomes are below the threshold income SY  and car users whose incomes are above SY .  
A commuter's willingness to pay for trips depends on the average variable cost of the mode 
they use, which includes the monetary operating cost and time cost.  In the case of bus trips, 
the average variable cost is the fare and the time lost in transit.  For car trips, this includes gas 
costs, tolls, vehicle operating costs and time costs.   
 We assume fixed traffic infrastructure and fixed locations for households and firms.  
All trips are thus from home to the central business district and back, so that as more 
commuters use the road, congestion occurs.  Let D be the total congestion damage from bus 
users ( bD ) and car users ( cD ).  This damage results in longer transit times, and, for 
convenience, we denominate it in terms of labour units and relate it to the number of 
individuals taking bus and trips, which is collinear with the number of each trip, i.e., 
D   =  bD  + cD          (6) 
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bD  = bbb N
λγ              bλ   > 1       (7) 
cD  = ccc N
λγ                 cλ      > 1       (8) 
where bγ  , bλ  , cγ  and cλ are the parameters for the congestion damage function for bus and 
car users respectively.  We assume bλ   and cλ   exceed unity, so that marginal exceeds average 
damage. 
Assuming that car users are solo drivers and buses have a larger capacity, there is a 
relationship between the number of car ( cN ) and bus commuters ( bN ) given by,  
 bN  =  θ cN                     θ > 1        (9) 
The average congestion damage (or average transit time cost) can thus be expressed in terms 
of cN  . 
AD =  [ bcb N
λθγ )(   +  ccc N λγ  ] / [(1+θ)] cN                 (10) 
In deciding the mode of transport, we assume commuters only consider the marginal 
private cost of their trip.  Marginal private costs are given by average congestion damage plus 
the monetary cost of the transportation mode, comprising fares, gas and non-congestion time 
costs.  These can be represented as follows: 
b
TP   = AVC b  = P b + AD                  (11)  
 cTP   = AVC c  = P c + AD                  (12)  
where P b , P c respectively represent the non-congestion costs of trips by bus and car.   
Each commuter ignores the incremental increase in damage arising from his use of the 
mode, that is, the external congestion cost imposed on other commuters. This cost is the 
additional time that a commuter imposes on others through increased congestion. This 
external cost, or marginal damage MD, can be found by taking the derivative of equation (6) 
with respect to cN , i.e.  
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MD  =  11 −− + cbb cccbb NN λλλ λγλγθ                                                (13) 
To close the model, each household is assumed to have a fixed endowment of time, T , 
which can be allocated to market labour supply wT , or time spent in transit, TT , i.e. 
  T  = wT    + TT           (14) 
 Market labour supply depends on time spent on transit, which in turn depends on the 
number of car and bus commuters. The time spent on transit TT  is an increasing function of cN .  
The time available for labour supply for car and bus users is: 
 wbT   = T  -  D b                   (15) 
 w
cT   = T  -  D c                   (16) 
 Labour supply is used in the production of G, which is a simple constant marginal 
product of labour production function, i.e., 
 G  =  β ( wbT   + wcT )                   (17) 
 In such an economy, the market outcome is not Pareto optimal since the marginal 
damage inflicted on others is not considered in an individual's modal choice decision.  
Individual workers when making their transit decisions take into account the average damage 
they face, rather than the marginal damage they inflict on all other workers in transit.  Gains 
are thus possible through an internalization tax, which results in workers making the socially 
appropriate transit decision.  In the present case, the issue is whether such internalization is 
best achieved via a tax on car usage, a tax on vehicle ownership, or some combination of 
both.  A Pigouvian tax, which internalizes the externality, needs to be set to correct the wedge 
between the marginal social cost and the private variable cost of trips, so as to create the 
appropriate incentives.  In the next section, we use numerical simulation methods to compare 
the efficiency of ownership and use taxes in both maximising overall welfare and raising 
revenue.  
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3. NUMERICAL COMPUTATIONS OF THE IMPACTS OF OPTIMAL  
OWNERSHIP AND USE TAXES 
 
 We used the structure set out in Section 2 to investigate numerically the impacts of 
ownership and use taxes based on Singaporean data.  We assume a Gamma distribution of 
individual wage rates to incorporate the heterogeneity of household incomes in the model.   
Since the amount of time available for market labour supply is endogenously determined in 
this structure, the time available for work becomes endogenous. In other words, household 
income becomes dependent on wage rates.  For convenience, we assume Cobb-Douglas 
household utility functions, for which the corresponding indirect utility functions for the bus 
and car regimes are given by:  
 )(ln)1()(ln)ln( bTs
w
b
B PPwTV αα −−−=                   (18) 
and 
 )(ln)1()(ln)ln( cTs
w
c
C PPFwTV αα −−−−=                 (19) 
where F is the fixed cost of car ownership.  
This allows us to equate BV  and CV  to calculate a critical value of w* at which that 
the population divides into bus and car users.  In other words, the bus users ( bN ) are those 
with a wage rate smaller than w*, and the car users ( cN ) are those with a wage rate greater 
than w*.  With the introduction of a use and/or an ownership taxes, the corresponding value 
of w* will change, yielding a new threshold wage rate with a new combination of ( bN  , cN ).   
This allows us to summarise the conditions under which BV  = CV  for different tax 
structures in the following equations:  
Use tax:  
),,( * bTg
w
bU
B PPTwV   =  ))1(,,( * CTUg
w
CU
C PPFTwV τ+−              (20) 
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Ownership tax: 
),,( * bTg
w
bf
B PPTwV  =  ),,)1(( * CTgf
w
Cf
C PPFTwV τ+−              (21) 
Joint Use and ownership tax:  
  ),,( * bTg
w
bj
B PPTwV   =  ))1(,,)1(( * CTUgf
w
Cj
C PPFTwV ττ ++−                        (22) 
 
In computing an equilibrium for use tax, we assume that the revenue from the use tax 
(R) is returned to all commuters in lump sum fashion so that every commuter's income is 
augmented by (R/N) independently of their choice of mode. *Uw , is then computed by equating 
indirect utility under the bus and car regimes.   
The indirect utility functions given this government intervention (and Cobb Douglas 
utility functions) are as follows: 
 )(ln)1()(ln)/ln( bTs
w
b
B PPNRwTV αα −−−+=     (23) 
 ))1((ln)1()(ln)/ln( cTUs
w
c
C PPNRFwTV ταα +−−−+−=    (24) 
 
Equating (23) and (24) yields *Uw   which is given by: 
*
Uw    = [(kP -1) R/N -  kP F] / [
w
bT  - 
w
cpTk   ]                               (25) 
where ])1[(/ cTU
b
Tp PPk τ+=  and *Uw  is the threshold wage that divides the population into 
bus ( bN ) and car users ( cN ) under a use tax at rate of Uτ .  The computed values of bN  and 
cN , together with other model parameters, yield average damage as given in equation (10), 
which then determines the price of trips by bus and car.   
The parametric specifications we use in our simulations reflecting this structure are 
taken to be representative of Singapore and are set out in Table 1.   
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[Place Table 1 here] 
 
Next, we will explain how the parameter values are specified in the simulation model 
which is representative of the Singapore’s experience.  The α parameter for the Cobb-Douglas 
utility function in equation (1) is set at 0.8.  This is a proxy for proportion of expenditure 
households spent on all other goods besides transport.  Data from the Singapore Statistical 
Highlights (1998, p.57) indicates that the expenditure share of transport and communications to 
be around 20 %.   
Fixed cost F is set at S$8,000.  The average price in Singapore of a medium size car is 
around S$100,000, which includes a scrap value of around S$20,000, so that the fixed cost of car 
ownership is around S$80,000.  Since cars are usually de-registered when they are 10 years old, 
the fixed cost of car ownership per year is taken to be S$8,000.  
To calibrate bγ   and  cγ   in the damage function in equations (7) and (8), we pre-specify  
bλ  = 1.05 and cλ  = 1.15.  Both bλ  and cλ  are greater than 1, reflecting that marginal damage 
is greater than zero and that the marginal damage from car is assumed to be higher than the 
marginal damage from bus.  
From estimates of transit time by bus and by car, together with data on the proportion 
of car user of 42% (Singapore General Household Survey 1995), we obtain the calibrated values 
of bγ  and  cγ  as 0.68 and 1.63 respectively.  The Singapore Bus Services (SBS) is one of the 
two major bus operators in Singapore and on its homepage, point-to-point average commuting 
time by buses are given.  For comparability of data to the average time travelled by car, we use 
data on the travelling time by bus from the major bus interchanges at the more densely populated 
satellite towns to the busiest station during the weekday peak hours (i.e. the Raffles Place 
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Station).  We then add on the wait time and walking time to the time travelled on bus to obtain the 
total transit time by bus.  The average transit time (including wait time) for bus commuter is 
about 65 minutes per trip.   
To calibrate the marginal damage, we assume a degree of equivalence between the 
number of commuters using the bus and cars, since most car commuters are solo drivers and 
damage incurred by one bus commuter is not the same as by one car driver.  In estimating θ, 
we use the concept of passenger car unit (PCU), which measures the road space used by a 
moving vehicle.  In our calibration of θ, we set the PCU of cars at 1, and that of bus at 2.  These 
estimates, together with the assumption that the average bus loading during peak hour is 40, allow 
us to set the equivalence between bus and car commuters at 20.  
To compute the total costs of trips for the different modal choice, we need to convert 
the average damage denominated in time in equation (10) into value terms.  To do so, we need 
the median income for the car and bus commuters.  For a compact city like Singapore it is not 
surprising that occupation is closely related to the mode of transport used.  Those with better 
paid jobs tend to use car while those in lower paid categories use the public transport.  Data 
from the General Household Survey 1995 show that the majority of the administrative and 
managerial worker (64%) and professional and technical workers (30%) use cars as the major 
mode of travel.  Only 11% of the clerical, sales and services workers and 7% of the 
production and related workers drive to work.  The median income per month for the bus user 
is S$1,400 and for the car user is S$3,750. 
The value of time in average damages reflects the different market values of time for 
the different income earners.  This is similar to Small (1983) who related the price of trips to 
the value of time, which is proportional to the marginal after-tax wage rate.  These estimates 
on the value of time are used to calculate average damage before the imposition of any tax in 
Equations (7) and (8).  This average damage estimate, together with the labour endowment of 
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208 hours per month and allows us to compute the labour supply for workers in the two 
regimes.  The resulting income and prices of car and bus trips and price of goods then allows 
us to solve for the optimum consumption of goods and trips and hence utility maximising 
behaviour.  
The gamma distribution over wage rates we use, Γ(x) = wζ-1 e –w is defined over a wage 
range from 0.5 to 20 with ζ = 6.5 representing the per capita monthly income of approximately 
S$6,500.  
  
4. SIMULATION RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
We measure changes in welfare across regimes as taxes change from ownership to use 
by aggregating the Hicksian Equivalent Variations (EVs) or Compensating Variations (CVs) 
over individuals.  In trying to identify the impacts of different tax interventions, we confine 
our analysis to one instrument at a time.  We increase gradually the tax rate for the particular 
regime and find the optimum tax rate that maximises the total EV or CV relative to the model 
base case.  In any counterfactual equilibrium, tax revenues are returned to all commuters in a 
lump sum manner.  We measure welfare not in a strict Pareto sense, but in terms of the 
potential Pareto improvement in social welfare.  In other words, the issue is whether gainers 
from a tax intervention could hypothetically compensate the losers from the same 
intervention. 
   
[Place Tables 2 and 3 here] 
 
Tables 2 and 3 display model solutions in the presence of optimum use and ownership 
taxes.  These results show that intervention, either through use or ownership taxes, raises 
utility for both car and bus users and that significant change in the use of cars and buses 
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result.  In the non-intervention benchmark equilibrium there are 42% car users; this drops to 
13% and 15% respectively when use and ownership taxes were introduced. 
Table 3 reports the Hicksian EVs as a percentage of GDP under the optimum 
ownership and use taxes.  At the optimum use tax, car users who remain on the road are made 
better off since lower traffic congestion increases labour productivity.  A smaller transit time 
means more units of labour are supplied to market activity.  This group gains 10.02 % of real 
income.  On the other hand, bus users, who also suffer from a loss in work time due to the 
congestion externality, are made only slightly better off with a tax on car use.  However, use 
taxes result in welfare losses for car users who are taxed off the road and have switched to bus 
use.  The loss amounts to 3.64 % of their initial income.  4 
In the new equilibrium with an ownership tax, car users are better off since on average 
the value of timesaving on the road exceeds the tax paid by car users.  Bus users gain from the 
transit time saved from less road congestion and from the income effects generated from the 
lump sum revenue redistribution.  In this case, fewer car users are taxed off the road, but they 
are also made worse off when they switch between transport modes. 
Because of the larger base, it is not surprising that optimum ownership tax is reached 
at a lower rate (39.8%) than for the use tax (95.7%).  However, results in Table 2 show that 
internalization of the congestion externality with use tax yields a higher total welfare gain 
(6.37% of total income) as compared to the corresponding total welfare gain under ownership 
tax (only 1.8%).  This underlines how the ownership tax cannot fully restore Pareto 
optimality.  The reason is that the ownership tax does not directly impact the price of trips, 
which in turn is the source of the congestion externality. 
                                                  
4 The welfare cost in this simulation comes from distortions from modal switching..  Wilson (1988) examines 
the effects of peak hour zone pricing (under the Area License Scheme) on scheduling changes and choices of 
transportation. In his model, the implementation of zone pricing during the peak hour decreases the utility of 
bus riders because of increased travel time, while car commuters benefited from the scheme.  There is an 
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Table 2 also reports results on the revenue productivity of use and ownership taxes.  
We compute the "excess burden" or the "dead-weight loss" per dollar of tax revenue raised 
beginning from the optimal tax equilibrium.  Simulations are run which increase the optimum 
ownership and use tax (i.e. *Uτ  = 95.7% and *fτ  = 39.8%), marginally by 0.01%.  We then 
compute the MWC by taking the ratio of the change in the Hicksian EV resulting from the 
marginal increase in tax rate to the change in revenue from the marginally higher tax rate.  
MWC  = ∆EV / ∆R                   (26) 
 
In terms of revenue productivity, ownership taxes are strongly preferred to use taxes.  
For every dollar raised through the ownership tax, an excess burden of 1.46 cents is 
generated, as compared to the marginal excess burden of 3.17 cents for every dollar raised 
through use taxes.  This is because an ownership tax is, in part, a lump sum tax borne from the 
surplus accruing to households who continue to use cars even with the tax.  In contrast, the 
use tax changes the price of trips and is fully distortionary at the margin.  As an externality 
correcting tax, the ownership tax falls far short of the use tax.  However, as a revenue-raising 
device around the initial equilibrium, it is superior because it is largely non-distorting. 
Finally, we have also used the model to study the effects of using combined ownership 
and use tax instruments to internalise the same congestion externality.5  We fixed the 
proportion of car users at 10% and compute the equilibrium when we adopt the optimum use 
tax and solve for the ownership tax that yields only 10% car users.  This equilibrium is then 
compared with the model solution when the optimum ownership tax is in place. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
overall fall in welfare for the society as a whole.  The estimation by McCarthy and Tay (1993) also suggests 
that there is negative welfare effect from peak hour zone pricing.  
5  The second best rule is to expand the capacity of a road until the marginal capital cost is equal to the 
marginal external congestion cost (see Hau (1992), p. 29).  But we assume fixed traffic infrastructure in our 
model.   
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[Place table 4 here] 
 
Our results in Table 4 show that if we have the welfare-maximizing use tax in place, at 
*
Uτ  = 95.8 %, in order to meet the target of 10% car commuters, it is necessary to impose an 
ownership tax of 5.6%.  On the other hand, if the optimum welfare maximising ownership tax 
*
fτ  = 39.8% is used; a 9.7 % tax on car use will achieve the target of 10% car users.   
While both fiscal instruments can be used to achieve the target level of car use, the 
two equilibria yield different welfare implications.  In terms of maximising welfare, it is 
better to set the optimum ownership tax first and then introducing a second fiscal instrument.  
Since the society’s welfare is already maximised at *Uτ  = 95.8 % and *fτ  = 39.8%, the use of 
another instrument will not enhance welfare.  Society as a whole will be made worse off and, 
as expected, the group that is made worse off are the car users.   
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
We have constructed a general equilibrium model that includes congestion 
externalities to compare the merits of ownership versus use taxes in a numerical simulation 
exercise using Singaporean data for the mid 1990’s.  We suggest that this can be applied to 
traffic control policy design elsewhere in Asia.  In the model we use, usage taxes can fully 
internalize congestion externalities while an ownership tax cannot.  This is because ownership 
taxes do not directly change the price of trips, which at the margin are the source of the 
externality.  However, in terms of revenue productivity, ownership taxes are substantially 
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more efficient as they result in smaller marginal excess burden than use taxes.6  Ownership 
taxes are heavily borne by people who continue to drive cars and thus are borne out of their 
surplus from their regime choice. 
Our traffic congestion model captures elements of traffic flow externalities stressed by 
Vickrey (1969), and as congestion in cities usually occurs in localized bottlenecks on 
stretches of expressways to the Central Business District, bridges, interchanges or narrow 
streets our model may be thought realistic.  There are, however, several missing elements.  
The model does not capture land price changes, shifts in wages and does not model any 
household or business location choice.  We have also not included a work-leisure choice or 
leisure-modal choice, although in practice there is a trade-off between time spent on transit 
and time spent at work.  While the model captures modal choice, it neither incorporates trade-
offs between peak and off peak travel times nor trip scheduling as modelled by Wilson 
(1988).  The model also abstracts from city planning in traffic policy, which in Singapore has 
always been seen as important, with the design of a number of satellite mini towns with 
shops, businesses, and service centres dispersed from the core area as part of the land use 
policy.  These challenging extensions are all left for future work. 
 
 
 
                                                  
6  The Hicksian EVs are calculated by returning all revenue to all commuters in a lump sum manner.  We can 
interpret this as revenue from motor vehicles are not earmarked but go to the production of a public good 
which will benefit all individuals equally.  Welfare measures may be sensitive to the redistributive schemes 
used in the calculations, for example if the revenue is returned as subsidies to the bus users.   
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Table 1 
Parameters specification used in simulation model representative of Singapore  
(US$1 = S$1.74) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
• Utility function: α =0.8  
• Fixed cost F = $8,000 
• Median income of car user: S$3,750 
• Median income of bus user: S$1500 
• Damage function:  bγ = 0.68, bλ  = 1.05, cγ c= 1.53, cλ  = 1.15 
• Equivalence between bN  and cN :  bN  = θ cN  , θ = 20 
• Gamma distribution:  Γ(x) = wζ-1 e -w ,  0.5 < w < 20,   ζ = 6.5  
______________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
 
Table 2 
Results from internalizing congestion externalities using ownership and use taxes 
 
 Non-intervention 
market solution 
Intervention with 
an optimum 
use tax 
Intervention with 
an optimum 
Ownership tax 
 
Critical Wage (w*) 
 
Optimum tax rate (%) 
 
Proportion of car users 
(%) 
 
Change in car users from 
the non-intervention 
equilibrium (%)  
 
 
 
6.7 
 
n.a. 
 
42 
 
9.4 
 
95.7 
 
13 
 
 
69.2 
 
9.2 
 
39.8 
 
15 
 
 
65.8 
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Table 3 
Welfare impacts of implementing optimum use and ownership taxes 
 
 
 Optimum Use tax 
*
Uτ  
Optimum Ownership Tax 
*
fτ  
 
Optimum tax rate (%) 
 
Hicksian EV as percent of 
total real income: 
• All commuters 
• Bus users 
• Car users 
• Car users who switch to 
bus under the new 
equilibrium 
 
 
Marginal excess burden of 
raising an extra dollar of tax 
revenue 
 
 
95.7 
 
 
 
6.37 
-0.01 
10.02 
-3.64 
 
 
 
 
 
3.17 cents 
 
 
39.8 
 
 
 
1.80 
0.40 
1.50 
-0.11 
 
 
 
 
 
1.46 cents 
 
 
 
Note: The same parameters specifications as in Table 1 are used in the computation of 
the counterfactual equilibria.  
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Table 4 
 
Welfare implications of using mixed fiscal instruments  
that limit car users to be 10% of commuters 
 
 
 Use tax together 
with *fτ = 39.8% 
Ownership tax together 
with *Uτ = 95.7% 
 
Tax rate to cap car users to 
10% 
 
Optimal wage (w*) 
 
Hicksian EV as percent of 
GDP: 
• All commuters 
• Bus users 
• Car users 
• Car users who switch to 
bus under the new 
equilibrium 
 
 
9.7 
 
 
9.9 
 
 
 
-51.1 
-0.003 
-54.2 
3.12 
 
 
 
 
5.6 
 
 
9.9 
 
 
 
-8.85 
-0.06 
-9.21 
0.301 
 
 
 
